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I. INTRODUCTION
During the Survey period, federal courts at all levels were busy render-
ing important bankruptcy decisions. These cases arise in both the con-
sumer and business context. The authors have selected decisions on legal
topics that should be of interest to both consumer and business bank-
ruptcy lawyers. This Survey is not intended to be an exhaustive coverage
of all bankruptcy decisions since last year’s survey. However, we hope the
reader will appreciate how courts are approaching some hard issues and
perhaps spot a trend or two as cases wind their way on appeal.
II. STRUCTURED DISMISSALS
A. PERMITTING STRUCTURED DISMISSALS OVER THE OBJECTION OF
CREDITORS IN VIOLATION OF THE ABSOLUTE PRIORITY
RULE: IN RE JEVIC HOLDING CORP.
One case now pending in the U.S. Supreme Court at the time of this
Survey could impact both business and consumer bankruptcy cases. In In
re Jevic Holding Corp., the case serving as the basis for the appeal to our
nation’s highest court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
examined whether a Chapter 11 case could “be resolved in a ‘structured
dismissal’ that deviates from the Bankruptcy Code’s priority system”
under 11 U.S.C. § 507.1 The case involved a declining trucking company
(the Debtor), that was acquired by the CIT group (CIT), a subsidiary of
equity firm Sun Capital Partners (Sun).2 After the Debtor filed for bank-
ruptcy protection, two lawsuits were filed in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court
for the District of Delaware. The first was filed by a group of the Debtor’s
terminated truck drivers (the Drivers) “alleging violations of federal and
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1. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Grp./Bus. Credit Inc. (In re Jevic
Holding Corp.), 787 F.3d 173, 175 (3d Cir. 2015), rev’d sub nom., Czyzewski v. Jevic Hold-
ing Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973 (2017).
2. Id.
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state Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Acts.”3
The second lawsuit was brought by the Official Committee of Unsecured
Creditors (the Committee), alleging a fraudulent conveyance action
against CIT and Sun in regards to CIT’s acquisition of the Debtor by
leveraged buyout.4
Ultimately, the Committee, CIT, and Sun reached a structured settle-
ment agreement that contemplated (1) a mutual release and dismissal of
the fraudulent conveyance action; (2) a payment by CIT to cover a por-
tion of the administrated expenses of the bankruptcy case; (3) a transfer
of Sun’s first priority lien on the only remaining cash in the estate to a
trust to pay tax and administrative claims, as well as unsecured creditors
on a pro rata basis; and (4) a dismissal of the Debtor’s Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy case.5 However, the settlement agreement did not include a recov-
ery to the Drivers on their uncontested WARN Act claims against the
Debtor, which the Drivers estimated to be worth approximately $12.5
million.6
The Drivers and the U.S. Trustee (the UST) objected to the proposed
settlement, arguing that the agreement violated the priority scheme
under Section 507 of the Bankruptcy Code.7 The UST further argued that
the Bankruptcy Code does not permit structured dismissals.8
The bankruptcy court noted that while the Bankruptcy Code does not
explicitly permit structured dismissals, an increasing number of bank-
ruptcy courts allow them when circumstances warrant such a result.9 The
bankruptcy court found that “dire” circumstances existed in the present
case and that without the proposed settlement, it was improbable that
any constituents besides secured creditors would receive a distribution
from the estate.10 Additionally, the bankruptcy court held that unlike
Chapter 11 plans, settlements are not required to comport with the abso-
lute priority rule.11 The bankruptcy court then applied the test of In re
Martin12 to the settlement and found that the settlement should be ap-
proved, and the Debtor’s bankruptcy case dismissed.13
The Drivers appealed, and the U.S. District Court for the District of
Delaware affirmed the bankruptcy court’s approval of the settlement and
3. Id. at 176.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 177.
6. Id.
7. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4) (2012); In re Jevic, 787 F.3d at 178.
8. In re Jevic, 787 F.3d at 178. The Drivers also alleged a breach of fiduciary duty by
the Committee, which will not be discussed for purposes of this summary. Id.
9. Id. In fact, one of the authors of this survey has approved two. See In re Olympic
1401 Elm Assocs., LLC, No. 16-30130-hdh, 2016 WL 4530602, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Aug.
29, 2016); In re Buffet Partners, L.P., No. 14-30699-HDH-11, 2014 WL 3735804, at *1
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. July 28, 2014).
10. In re Jevic, 787 F.3d at 178.
11. Id.
12. 91 F.3d 389, 393 (3d Cir. 1996).
13. In re Jevic, 787 F.3d at 178–79.
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dismissal of the Chapter 11 case.14 The Drivers then filed an appeal in the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.15 The only issue on appeal
was whether the bankruptcy court had discretion to approve a structured
dismissal over the objection of creditors when doing so would result in a
violation of the statutory priority scheme.16
In holding that the bankruptcy court was permitted to approve a struc-
tured dismissal in this “rare” instance, the Third Circuit preliminarily
found that structured dismissals are allowable under the Bankruptcy
Code so long as there was not an attempt to “evade the procedural pro-
tections and safeguards of the plan confirmation or conversion
processes.”17 The Third Circuit admitted that settlements must be “fair
and equitable”18 but pointed out that neither Congress nor the Supreme
Court has found that the absolute priority rule applies to settlements as
well.19
The Third Circuit rejected the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Matter of
AWECO, Inc.,20 which strictly applied the “fair and equitable” stan-
dard—and in turn the absolute priority rule—to settlements under the
Bankruptcy Code.21 Instead, the Third Circuit agreed with the Second
Circuit’s rationale in In re Iridium Operating LLC, which found that even
a settlement that violates the absolute priority rule may “be approved
when the remaining factors weigh heavily in favor of approving a settle-
ment.”22 The Third Circuit emphasized the importance of fair dealing in
settlements and that in these cases there must be “specific and credible”
reasons to excuse the nonconformity with the Code’s priority scheme.23
While the Third Circuit admitted the decision was a “close call,” it ulti-
mately held that, in this rare instance, the bankruptcy court was justified
in approving a structured dismissal because it was the “least bad alterna-
tive.”24 The Third Circuit affirmed the district court, and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari on June 28, 2016; oral argument was held on
December 7, 2016.25
Allowing the parties to depart from the statutory priorities by agree-
ment raises concerns. In re Jevic Holding Corp. presents hard facts and,
14. Id. at 179.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 180.
17. Id. at 182. The Third Circuit did not opine as to whether a structured dismissal
would be permitted in a case where it is conceivable that a plan will be confirmed or
conversion might benefit the estate. Id. at 181–82.
18. See id. at 182 (quoting Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer
Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 424 (1968)).
19. Id. at 183.
20. 725 F.2d 293, 295–96 (5th Cir. 1984).
21. In re Jevic, 787 F.3d at 183–84.
22. Id. at 183 (quoting Motorola, Inc. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re
Iridium Operating LLC), 478 F.3d 452, 464 (2d Cir. 2007)).
23. Id. at 184 (citing In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d at 466).
24. Id. at 184–85.
25. Id. at 186; see also Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 136 S.Ct. 2541 (2016); Tran-
script of Oral Argument, Czyewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973 (2017) (No. 15-
649).
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as the saying goes, those cases often make bad law. To the authors, this
case appears incongruent with the rights of creditors in a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding, although limiting the holding to these facts certainly helps.
Whether the Supreme Court agrees remains to be seen.26
B. STRUCTURED DISMISSALS IN INVOLUNTARY BANKRUPTCY CASES:
IN RE POSITRON CORPORATION
Bankruptcy courts in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
continue to consider the use of structured dismissals as an exit for Chap-
ter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. In In re Positron Corp.,27 the U.S. Bank-
ruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas considered whether it
could approve a structured dismissal in a pending involuntary Chapter 11
case when a non-petitioning creditor opposed the settlement. After the
filing of a bankruptcy proceeding against the Putative Debtor, the Puta-
tive Debtor and certain of its creditors sought a structured dismissal of
the bankruptcy case.28 The structured dismissal contemplated the refiling
of a bankruptcy petition by the Putative Debtor if the structured dismis-
sal was not granted or if the Putative Debtor materially breached the
terms of the agreement.29 One unsecured creditor opposed the settlement
agreement, arguing that it was an improper sub rosa plan and violated the
Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme under § 1129(b).30
The bankruptcy court noted that in the typical bankruptcy case, barring
an objection or something “untoward” in the proposed dismissal, it
should be approved notwithstanding the lack of explicit authorization for
structured dismissals in the Bankruptcy Code.31 However, the bankruptcy
court emphasized that in the context of an involuntary bankruptcy pro-
ceeding, the Bankruptcy Code only permits two options: granting an or-
der for relief or dismissal of the proceeding.32 Thus, although the
bankruptcy judge found merit to the proposed structured dismissal, he
found that he had no authority to approve it.33
The bottom line may be that structured dismissals are allowed outside
pending involuntary proceedings, but only in limited circumstances. As
mentioned in this Survey, the U.S. Supreme Court has before it a struc-
tured dismissal case that should provide plenty of additional guidance on
the subject.34
26. The Supreme Court issued an opinion reversing and remanding the Third Circuit’s
decision in In re Jevic Holding Corp. outside of the Survey period. See Czyzewski v. Jevic
Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 987 (2017).
27. 556 B.R. 291, 291–92 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2016).
28. Id. at 291.
29. Id. at 293.
30. Id. at 291–92, 295; see 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2012).
31. In re Positron, 556 B.R. at 294.
32. Id. at 295.
33. Id. at 295–96.
34. See Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973 (2017).
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III. THE EXEMPT CHARACTER OF PROCEEDS
A. LOSS OF EXEMPT CHARACTER IN IRA PROCEEDS: IN RE HAWK
Cases involving the proceeds of exempt property continue to create
issues for the bankruptcy courts. There are plenty of homestead cases,
some of which are discussed in this Survey. The new issue seems to be the
treatment of funds withdrawn from retirement accounts. Debtors with
such accounts—and their lawyers—should beware of the harsh results of
some recent cases.
In In re Hawk, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Texas evaluated the scope of a debtor’s claimed exemption of his interest
in an individual retirement account (IRA), finding that, under Texas law,
Chapter 7 debtors who withdraw funds from exempt IRAs post-petition
must roll over those funds into another exempt IRA account within sixty
days.35 If they fail to do so, the funds become nonexempt property of the
estate.36
The case involved a Chapter 7 debtor (the Debtor) who claimed an
exemption under Texas law for two IRA accounts from his bankruptcy
estate under 11 U.S.C. § 522. After the petition date, the Debtor with-
drew funds from one account but did not roll them over into a new ex-
empt IRA. Upon learning of these funds, the Chapter 7 Trustee (the
Trustee) filed a motion for turnover. The Trustee argued that since the
Debtor failed to reinvest in another exempt IRA within sixty days, under
Section 42.0021 of the Texas Property Code,37 the funds automatically
reverted to the bankruptcy estate.38
The Trustee relied on the decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit in In re Frost regarding exempt homestead proceeds and
argued that it should apply to the IRA proceeds by analogy.39 In In re
Frost, the Fifth Circuit held that under Texas property law, homestead
proceeds must be reinvested in another exempt homestead within six
months in order to maintain their exempt status.40 The Debtor in the in-
stant case disagreed, arguing that the funds he had withdrawn did not lose
their exempt status merely because he did not reinvest them since the
funds “were withdrawn after the deadline for objections to exemptions”
and were fixed in character as of the date of the bankruptcy filing.41 The
bankruptcy court ruled in favor of the Trustee, and the district court
affirmed.42
35. Hawk v. Engelhart (In re Hawk), 556 B.R. 788, 799–800 (S.D. Tex. 2016), appeal
docketed, No. 16-20641 (5th Cir. Sept. 26, 2016).
36. Id. at 800.
37. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.0021 (West 2014).
38. In re Hawk, 556 B.R. at 793.
39. Id. at 793–94 (citing Viegelahn v. Frost (In re Frost), 744 F.3d 384, 385 (5th Cir.
2014)).
40. Id. at 793 (citing In re Frost, 744 F.3d at 385).
41. Id. at 794.
42. Id. at 801.
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The Fifth Circuit has not directly ruled on this issue, and bankruptcy
courts are split regarding the permanency of exemptions after the date
they are allowed.43 The district court in the instant case emphasized that
under § 522, the Debtor had a choice as to whether to proceed under
state or federal law.44 In choosing to proceed under Texas law, he was
bound by its rules. The district court agreed with the bankruptcy court’s
rationale in finding that the “Texas Proceeds Rule” under Section
41.001(c) of the Texas Property Code,45 requiring property owners selling
their exempt homestead to reinvest the proceeds within six months or
lose the exemption, applies by analogy to the facts of this case under Sec-
tion 42.0021.46 In reaching its conclusion, the district court cited favorably
the logic in In re Frost, which stated that an “essential element of the
exemption must continue in effect” and that the status quo of exempt
assets must be maintained throughout the pendency of the bankruptcy
case.47 Since the funds were removed from the IRA account during the
pendency of the bankruptcy case and were not reinvested within the
sixty-day period, under Texas law they lost their exemption status and
automatically became property of the estate.48
This holding certainly presents practical problems to older debtors who
rely upon their retirement funds for their living expenses. The authors
hope that the Fifth Circuit will soon weigh in to provide clear guidance to
lower courts.
B. ANOTHER VIEW ON IRA PROCEEDS: IN RE MOORE
Not all courts during the Survey period held that distributions of pro-
ceeds of retirement funds go into the estate and to the trustee. Judge
Rhoades of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Texas
carefully considered Texas and bankruptcy law to come to a well-rea-
soned conclusion. In In re Moore, the bankruptcy court decided the scope
of a debtor’s claimed exemption of her interest in IRA distributions.49
The Chapter 7 debtor (the Debtor) claimed an exemption under Texas
law for a disclosed interest in an IRA.50 Post-petition, the Debtor with-
drew funds from the exempted account and did not reinvest them in an-
other exempt IRA.51 The Chapter 7 Trustee (the Trustee) objected to the
claimed exemption, arguing that the IRA funds were only conditionally
exempt and lost their exempt character when the funds were not rolled
43. Id. at 800.
44. Id. at 799 (citing Camp v. Ingalls (In re Camp), 631 F.3d 757, 759 (5th Cir. 2011); In
re Jarboe, 365 B.R. 717, 720 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2007)).
45. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001(c) (West 2014).
46. Id. at 788 n.3, 800.
47. Id. at 800 (quoting Viegelahn v. Frost (In re Frost), 744 F.3d 384, 387 (5th Cir.
2014)).
48. Id. at 800–01.





over into another exempt account.52
Similar to the argument made by the trustee in In re Hawk,53 the Trus-
tee in this case argued that the holding of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit in the In re Frost case—that a debtor’s failure to reinvest
homestead proceeds into a new homestead within six months automati-
cally resulted in the proceeds becoming property of the estate—should
control by analogy.54 The Trustee sought to extend the Fifth Circuit’s
holding in In re Frost under Section 41.001(c) of the Texas Property Code
to the IRA exemption statute under Section 42.0021(c) of the same
code.55
Upon review, the bankruptcy court overruled the Trustee’s objection,
holding that the IRA statute is “fundamentally different” than the home-
stead statute under Texas law.56 Rather than merely exempting the indi-
vidual retirement account itself, Texas law exempts the account holder’s
rights to the assets in the account and her right to receive the payments
from the account.57 Retirement funds do not lose their exemption after
withdrawal, and Texas law explicitly prohibits turnover of “proceeds of,
or the disbursement of, property exempt under” the IRA exemption
statute.58
Furthermore, the bankruptcy court noted that there is no “IRA pro-
ceeds” rule analogous to the homestead proceeds rule and that it would
be contrary to the policy behind the exemption to hold that the IRA ex-
emption can be extinguished if the funds are not deposited into another
exempt retirement account.59 The bankruptcy court also applied the
“snapshot rule” and found that the Debtor’s interest in the funds in her
IRA and her right to receive distributions from it were exempt on the
petition date, and her subsequent action did not change their exemption
status.60 Thus, the bankruptcy court overruled the Trustee’s objection to
the exemption and held that the Debtor’s IRA distributions remained
exempt.61
Lawyers are thus faced with the In re Hawk case versus the In re Moore
decision. The authors hope that the Fifth Circuit will provide judges and
practitioners some guidance on this issue.
52. Id.
53. Hawk v. Engelhart (In re Hawk), 556 B.R. 788, 793–94 (S.D. Tex. 2016), appeal
docketed, No. 16-20641 (5th Cir. Sept. 26, 2016).
54. In re Moore, 2016 WL 3704723 at *1; see Viegelahn v. Frost (In re Frost), 744 F.3d
384, 385 (5th Cir. 2014).
55. In re Moore, 2016 WL 3704723, at *1, *2.
56. Id. at *3.
57. Id.
58. Id. at *4 (quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 31.002(f) (West 2015)).
59. Id. at *5.
60. Id. at *5, *6.
61. Id. at *6.
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C. THE EXEMPT CHARACTER OF HOMESTEAD PROCEEDS:
IN RE MONTEMAYOR
As most practitioners know, Texas has a well-established tradition of
protecting a debtor’s homestead.62 In fact, protecting a debtor’s home-
stead is such an essential part of Texas law that it is rooted in the state
constitution.63 However, issues sometimes arise surrounding the question
of whether the debtor’s homestead should receive the liberal protections
afforded by the law. In In re Montemayor, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for
the Southern District of Texas faced the unenviable task of wading into
Texas homestead laws and relevant case law to determine if a debtor (the
Debtor) was still entitled to his homestead exemption when he had not
reinvested the proceeds from a sale of an exempted homestead into his
new homestead.64 The bankruptcy judge did a thorough job in a well-
reasoned opinion on the topic.
The Debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 7 petition on January 27, 2014.65
In his schedules, the Debtor claimed his Texas state exemptions and
properly exempted his half-interest in his homestead.66 “[N]either the
[Chapter 7] Trustee [(the Trustee)] [n]or any party in interest filed an
objection to the Debtor’s claimed homestead exemption.”67
Four months later, the Debtor sought the bankruptcy court’s permis-
sion to sell his homestead, which the bankruptcy court granted.68 The
proceeds of the sale extinguished the outstanding liens on the homestead,
and the remaining monies were distributed to the Debtor equivalent to
his half interest in the property.69 The Debtor then immediately used a
portion of the funds to purchase a lot and to prepare the land for con-
struction of a new homestead.70 However, some of the proceeds of the
sale were not reinvested in the new homestead and were instead depos-
ited into the Debtor’s bank account.71 The Trustee sought turnover of the
homestead proceeds that had not been reinvested in the new homestead
within six months after the sale.72
Relying on the holding of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit in the In re Frost73 case, the Trustee argued that the Debtor’s failure
to reinvest the remaining proceeds in the new homestead within six
62. See, e.g., Romo v. Montemayor (In re Montemayor), 547 B.R. 684, 695 (Bankr.
S.D. Tex. 2016).
63. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50.
64. In re Montemayor, 547 B.R. at 686.
65. Id. at 686–87.





71. Id. at 688.
72. Id.; see TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001(c) (West 2014) (“The homestead claim-
ant’s proceeds of a sale of a homestead are not subject to seizure for a creditor’s claim for
six months after the date of sale.”).
73. Viegelahn v. Frost (In re Frost), 744 F.3d 384, 385 (5th Cir. 2014).
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months of the homestead sale caused them to become non-exempt.74 The
bankruptcy court distinguished the Fifth Circuit’s holding in In re Frost,
emphasizing that at the time the debtor in In re Frost sold his homestead,
it was property of the estate even though it was fully exempted.75 Fur-
thermore, the bankruptcy court found that the proceeds from the home-
stead in In re Frost, pursuant to the Chapter 13 plan, became non-exempt
property of the estate when the exemption lapsed.76
Unlike in In re Frost—a Chapter 13 case where the homestead pro-
ceeds were exempted but remained property of the estate without revest-
ing in the debtor until the temporal exemption expired—in the instant
case, the bankruptcy court found that the Debtor’s homestead exemption
became “final” when the Trustee failed to object to the exemption.77 The
bankruptcy court emphasized the fact that the Debtor was a Chapter 7
debtor rather than a Chapter 13 debtor like the debtor in In re Frost.78
The bankruptcy court concluded that, due to this distinction, when the
homestead exemption became “final,” the exemption and its proceeds
were no longer property of the estate.79
Accordingly, the Debtor was entitled to the remaining proceeds from
the sale; however, the bankruptcy court noted the potential threat of
claims by post-petition creditors to the monies.80 Furthermore, the bank-
ruptcy court sua sponte granted the Debtor summary judgment on the
new homestead’s exempt status.81
The bankruptcy court’s opinion in In re Montemayor walks through
much of the case law related to the exemption of homestead proceeds,
which lays the foundation for the court’s conclusion and allows it to reach
a logical result. For a practitioner, the benefits are twofold. First, if a
Chapter 7 client wishes to sell his homestead post-petition, this is a case
to keep in the arsenal. Second, the opinion’s discussion of the relevant
case law is an excellent primer on the issue of exempt homestead
proceeds.
IV. FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS
A. BENEFICIARIES OF FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS: JANVEY V.
LIBYAN INVESTMENT AUTHORITY
The Allen Stanford Ponzi scheme seems to be a set of facts that keeps
on giving, at least in terms of case law. During the most recent Survey
period, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit weighed in several
times on the reach of fraudulent transfer law.
74. In re Montemayor, 547 B.R. at 689.
75. Id. at 708; see In re Frost, 744 F.3d at 389.
76. In re Montemayor, 547 B.R. at 712.
77. Id. at 713.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 713–14.
81. Id. at 716.
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In Janvey v. Libyan Investment Authority, a corporate parent was not
an “entity for whose benefit” an allegedly fraudulent transfer was made
merely due to the corporate parent’s status as sole shareholder of an ini-
tial transferee.82 Stanford devised a Ponzi scheme that he carried out
through a group of related entities by selling certificates of deposits
(CDs) to investors.83 Instead of investing the funds, however, Stanford
used newly acquired funds to redeem earlier investors’ matured CDs.84
A court-appointed receiver sought to recover the proceeds of some of
the CDs that had been transferred to the Libyan Foreign Investment
Company (LFICO), under the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act
(TUFTA).85 The receiver sought the funds not only from LFICO, but
also from LFICO’s sole shareholder, the Libyan Investment Authority
(LIA), arguing that LIA was the person “for whose benefit the transfer
was made.”86 In response, LIA argued that it was not a beneficiary of the
transfer merely because it was the shareholder of the initial transferee.87
In agreeing with LIA, the Fifth Circuit favorably cited a decision of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois, which held
that shareholders are not beneficiaries of transfers “unless they actually
received distributions of the transferred property . . . or a showing can be
made to pierce the corporate veil.”88 The Fifth Circuit distinguished two
cases relied upon by the receiver—Esse v. Empire Energy III, Ltd.89 and
Citizens National Bank of Texas v. NXS Construction, Inc.90—in which
the shareholders were involved with the transfer, benefitted from the
transfer, or participated in the wrongdoing.91
The Fifth Circuit found that LIA neither received an “independent
benefit” from the transfer nor held the status of an alter ego of LFICO,
and thus it was not a beneficiary of the transfer for purposes of TUFTA.92
This case is a good reminder that shareholders of the corporations they
own are separate under the law absent a special set of facts not proven in
this case.
B. “VALUE” UNDER TUFTA: JANVEY V. GOLF CHANNEL, INC.
In another Stanford-related decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, with the help of the Texas Supreme Court, clarified a re-
quirement under Texas’s fraudulent transfer law. In Janvey v. Golf Chan-
nel, Inc., the Fifth Circuit affirmed a lower court’s decision to deny a
82. Janvey v. Libyan Inv. Auth., 840 F.3d 248, 265 n.78, 266 (5th Cir. 2016).
83. Id. at 254.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 265.
86. Id.; see TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.009(b)(1) (West 2015).
87. Janvey, 840 F.3d at 266.
88. Id. (quoting Schechter v. 5841 Bldg. Corp. (In re Hansen), 341 B.R. 638, 646
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006)).
89. 333 S.W.3d 166, 181 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied).
90. 387 S.W.3d 74 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.).
91. Janvey, 840 F.3d at 266.
92. Id. at 265–66.
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claw-back request under TUFTA after receiving guidance from the Texas
Supreme Court.93 The court-appointed receiver for Stanford Interna-
tional Bank, Ltd. (Stanford) sought to recover $5.9 million in fraudulent
transfers paid by Stanford to The Golf Channel, Inc. (Golf Channel) in
exchange for “advertising services aimed at recruiting additional inves-
tors into Stanford’s multi-billion dollar Ponzi scheme” under Section
24.005(a)(1) of TUFTA.94 The U.S. District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Texas granted Golf Channel’s motion for summary judgment
upon finding that it established the affirmative defense of receiving the
payments “in good faith and for a reasonably equivalent value.”95 The
Fifth Circuit initially reversed, reasoning that “the [$5.9 million in] pay-
ments to Golf Channel were not for ‘value’ because [the] advertising ser-
vices could only have depleted the value of the Stanford estate and thus
did not benefit Stanford’s creditors.”96 However, the Fifth Circuit ulti-
mately vacated its order and certified a question to the Texas Supreme
Court regarding the definition of “value” under TUFTA.97
The supreme court concluded that:
TUFTA’s “reasonably equivalent value” requirement can be satis-
fied with evidence that the transferee (1) fully performed under a
lawful, arm’s-length contract for fair market value, (2) provided con-
sideration that had objective value at the time of the transaction, and
(3) made the exchange in the ordinary course of the transferee’s
business.98
The existence of a Ponzi scheme does not change the “value” inquiry
under TUFTA so long as “the services would have been available to an-
other buyer at market rates” in the absence of the scheme.99 The Fifth
Circuit clarified that consideration can have “objective value” even if it
does not benefit the estate or “generate[ ] an asset . . . that could be lev-
ied to satisfy . . . creditors.”100 Because Golf Channel’s television airtime
would have been available to other buyers absent Stanford’s purchase,
the Fifth Circuit determined that the “advertising services had objective
value . . . regardless of Stanford’s financial solvency at the time” of the
transaction.101 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
grant of summary judgment for Golf Channel.102
93. Janvey v. Golf Channel, Inc. (Golf Channel IV), 834 F.3d 570, 573 (5th Cir. 2016).
94. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.005(a)(1) (West 2015); Golf Channel IV, 834
F.3d at 571.
95. Golf Channel IV, 834 F.3d at 571.
96. Id. at 571–72 (citing Janvey v. Golf Channel, Inc. (Golf Channel I), 780 F.3d 641,
646 (5th Cir.), vacated and superseded on reh’g, (Golf Channel II), 792 F.3d 539 (5th Cir.
2015)).
97. Id. at 572; see Golf Channel II, 792 F.3d at 547 (5th Cir. 2015), certifying question to
(Golf Channel III), 487 S.W.3d 560 (Tex. 2016).
98. Golf Channel III, 487 S.W.3d at 564.
99. Golf Channel IV, 834 F.3d at 572 (quoting Golf Channel III, 487 S.W.3d at 570).
100. Id. (quoting Golf Channel III, 487 S.W.3d at 577).
101. Id. (citing Golf Channel III, 487 S.W.3d at 581–82).
102. Id. at 573.
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This second holding by the Fifth Circuit, after guidance from the su-
preme court, seems correct to the authors. A contrary result would have
perhaps exposed every honest vendor of the Stanford entities to fraudu-
lent transfer liability, a result that seems contrary to the purpose of fraud-
ulent transfer law and practicality.
C. REASONABLY EQUIVALENT VALUE: IN RE WORLDWIDE
DIAMOND VENTURES, L.P.
Bankruptcy cases are not always limited to dull fact patterns about
mortgages, notes, and defaults. In In re Worldwide Diamond Ventures, a
Chapter 7 trustee (the Trustee) was entitled to avoidance and recovery of
a transfer of a 6.32-carat pink diamond because the Debtor had not pro-
vided reasonably equivalent value in exchange for it.103 The Trustee
brought an adversary proceeding against Sharpshooter II, Inc. (Sharp-
shooter) to recover funds paid to Sharpshooter by the Debtor for the
diamond (the Pink Diamond) under 11 U.S.C. §§ 544 and 550, on the
grounds that the transaction was a constructive fraudulent transfer under
TUFTA.104
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas had pre-
viously granted partial summary judgment to the Trustee on the insol-
vency element of TUFTA and on Sharpshooter’s affirmative defense of
statute of limitations.105 The only remaining issue before the bankruptcy
court was whether the Debtor had received “reasonably equivalent
value” in exchange for the Pink Diamond.106
The undisputed facts show that the Pink Diamond was purchased and
sold five times over a six-year period beginning in 2007.107 The sales price
for each of those transactions was $218,000, $250,000, $295,000, $600,000
(the transaction at issue in this case), and $190,000 respectively.108 It ap-
pears that the Debtor was willing to pay more than double what the pre-
vious purchaser had paid because Sharpshooter showed the Debtor “two
grossly inflated appraisals.”109
In granting the Trustee’s motion, the bankruptcy court cited a bank-
ruptcy court decision out of the Southern District of Texas, later affirmed
103. Milbank v. Sharpshooter II, Inc. (In re Worldwide Diamond Ventures, LP), 559
B.R. 143, 144–45, 151 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2016).
104. Id. at 145. TUFTA provides that:
A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a cred-
itor whose claim arose before the transfer was made or the obligation was
incurred if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation without
receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obli-
gation and the debtor was insolvent at that time or the debtor became insol-
vent as a result of the transfer or obligation.
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.006(a) (West 2015).
105. In re Worldwide Diamond Ventures, 559 B.R. at 147.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 148.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 149. One of the appraisals valued the ring at $1,400,000 while the second
valued it at $1,011,200.
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by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, finding that when de-
termining whether reasonably equivalent value was given, “[t]he salient
issue is whether the estate lost value.”110 After purchasing the Pink Dia-
mond at a price that was double the amount of the last purchase price,
the Debtor subsequently sold it for an amount lower than one-third of its
purchase price.111 The bankruptcy court found that there was no question
of material fact that the estate lost value when the Debtor paid $600,000
for the Pink Diamond.112
After concluding that the Trustee was entitled to avoid and recover the
transfer to Sharpshooter, the bankruptcy court then determined the value
the estate had lost.113 The bankruptcy court determined that the actual
value of the Pink Diamond was $210,000—the highest bid received at a
Sotheby’s auction from 2015.114 This sales price was used by the bank-
ruptcy court because it was received after significant marketing efforts
and was the only value that “was truly fair and arms-length.”115
The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment in favor of the Trus-
tee for $390,000, the difference between the amount paid for the Pink
Diamond by the Debtor ($600,000) and the actual value of the Pink Dia-
mond ($210,000).116
Although bankruptcy courts do not see many pink diamond cases, they
are often required to make value determinations. This case is a good illus-
tration of a solid, practical approach to value in the context of a fraudu-
lent transfer lawsuit.
V. DISMISSAL UNDER SECTION 707(A) FOR CAUSE:
IN RE KRUEGER
May a bankruptcy court dismiss an individual Chapter 7 liquidation for
bad faith? In a case with somewhat startling facts, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit answered with an empathetic “Yes!”117 In In re
Krueger, the Fifth Circuit examined the circumstances in which a Chapter
7 case can be dismissed under § 707(a) for cause due to a debtor’s bad
faith.118 The Debtor was engaged in state court litigation against his for-
mer business partner.119 The Debtor filed his Chapter 7 bankruptcy peti-
tion one day prior to a show cause hearing ordered by the state court for
violation of a temporary restraining order and temporary injunction.120
110. Id. at 150 (quoting Smith v. Suarez (In re IFS Fin. Corp.), 417 B.R. 419, 442
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009), aff’d, 669 F.3d 255 (5th Cir. 2012)).
111. Id. at 150.





117. Krueger v. Torres (In re Krueger), 812 F.3d 365, 367 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 137 S.
Ct. 314 (2016).
118. 11 U.S.C. § 707(a) (2012); In re Krueger, 812 F.3d at 370.
119. In re Krueger, 812 F.3d at 367.
120. Id.
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The Debtor’s former business partner responded by filing a motion to
dismiss the Debtor’s bankruptcy case for cause under 11 U.S.C.
§ 707(a).121 “[T]he bankruptcy court granted the motion to dismiss for
cause . . . and imposed a two-year refiling bar on [the Debtor].”122 The
Debtor “unsuccessfully sought reconsideration and appeal to the district
court,” and then appealed to the Fifth Circuit.123
The Fifth Circuit described the appeal as an “exercise in chutzpah”
(usually not a good sign) and affirmed the bankruptcy court’s dismis-
sal.124 The Debtor argued that his case could only be dismissed under
§ 707(a) for cause for actions that are not covered by more specific Bank-
ruptcy Code provisions, that the “for cause” requirement was “technical
and procedural in nature,” and that the absence of an “explicit good faith
requirement in Chapter 7” meant that his case could not be dismissed for
bad faith.125 The Fifth Circuit dismissed each of these arguments in
turn.126
The Fifth Circuit pointed out that Congress kept the phrase “for cause”
purposefully broad and that there is no textual qualification for the lan-
guage.127 Additionally, it noted that more specific provisions in the Code
do not cover the same actions or remedies and apply at different stages of
the case than § 707(a).128 It held that a debtor’s bad faith can be cause for
dismissal under § 707(a) and that in determining whether the debtor had
acted in bad faith, the court has wide discretion and can consider the
debtor’s actions before, during, and after filing a bankruptcy petition.129
The Fifth Circuit emphasized that the force of the automatic stay was
meant to aid the “honest but unfortunate debtor” and that it “ha[d] no
place being deployed against honest but unfortunate creditors who stand
in the path of a dishonest bankrupt.”130
The evidence showed that the Debtor “filed bankruptcy for illegitimate
purposes, misled the court and other parties, and engaged in bare-
knuckle litigation practices, including lying under oath and threatening
witnesses.”131 The Fifth Circuit explained:
Under a flexible, totality of the circumstances approach, . . . [Debtor]
filed chapter 7 because of a criminal contempt proceeding pending
against him, because his state court litigation had taken a turn for the
worse, and to provide him the cover to retake control of [the busi-
ness]. These “non-economic motives” are “unworthy of bankruptcy
protection.” Once his chapter 7 case commenced, [Debtor] engaged
121. Id. at 368.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 368–69.
124. Id. at 366–67.
125. Id. at 372–73.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 372.
128. Id. at 372, 373.
129. Id. at 370, 372.
130. Id. at 373; see Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286–87 (1991).
131. In re Krueger, 812 F.3d at 374.
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in conduct designed to manipulate the proceedings to his own ends,
including false filings, false testimony, and witness intimidation. His
duplicitous behavior is exactly the sort of conduct contemplated by
most courts as giving cause for dismissal under § 707(a).132
The Fifth Circuit therefore affirmed the judgments of the bankruptcy
court and district court in dismissing the Debtor’s case for cause under
§ 707(a).133
In re Krueger has strong facts that no doubt led the Fifth Circuit to its
conclusion; however, § 707(a)’s language is certainly broad enough to in-
clude bad faith, and the case seems to the authors to be decided correctly.
The lesson for debtors’ counsel would be to reign in the recalcitrant
debtor before filing, or avoid bankruptcy court altogether.
VI. DISCHARGE
A. ACTUAL FRAUD UNDER 11 U.S.C. § 523: HUSKY INTERNATIONAL
ELECTRONICS, INC. V. RITZ
During the Survey period, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down only
one bankruptcy decision. However, the case’s import may be vast. In
Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz, the Supreme Court adopted
a broad reading of the term “actual fraud” as it is used in 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(2)(A), the discharge exception for debts obtained by “false pre-
tenses, a false representation, or actual fraud.”134
The case arose after Chrysalis Manufacturing Corporation (Chrysa-
lis)—a Texas-based company that manufactures circuit boards—pur-
chased component parts from Husky International Electronics (Husky),
incurring a debt of nearly $164,000 over the course of four years.135 Dur-
ing this time, Daniel Lee Ritz, Jr. (Ritz), who served as a director of
Chrysalis, transferred large sums of Chrysalis funds to other entities he
controlled. When the Chrysalis debt went unpaid, Husky sought to re-
cover the debt from Ritz personally, who filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy
shortly thereafter. Husky initiated an adversary proceeding in Ritz’s
bankruptcy case, arguing that the Chrysalis debt could not be discharged
because Ritz’s fraudulent conveyances constituted “actual fraud” under
§ 523(a)(2)(A).136 The district court disagreed, and held that the dis-
charge exception did not apply.137 On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that a false representation is a nec-
essary element of “actual fraud” under § 523(a)(2)(A).138
132. Id. at 375 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Huckfeldt v. Huckfeldt (In re
Huckfeldt), 39 F.3d 829, 833 (8th Cir. 1994)).
133. Id. at 376.
134. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2012); Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct.
1581, 1590 (2016).
135. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. at 1585.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1585–86.
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The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts, relying upon the legisla-
tive history of the Bankruptcy Code to hold that the term “actual fraud”
encompasses forms of fraud that can be perpetrated without a false repre-
sentation, such as fraudulent conveyances.139 The Code originally barred
the discharge of debts obtained by “false pretenses or false representa-
tions,” but Congress later amended the provision to add “actual
fraud.”140 According to the Supreme Court, this change demonstrated
that “Congress did not intend ‘actual fraud’ to mean the same thing as ‘a
false representation.’”141
Furthermore, the Supreme Court noted, common law supports that
conclusion, as fraudulent conveyances are “not an inducement-based
fraud.”142 Because fraudulent conveyances are often concealed, there are
limited opportunities for the debtor to put forth a false representation; as
a result, “[a false representation] could hardly be considered a defining
feature of this kind of fraud.”143 Accordingly, the Supreme Court re-
versed the Fifth Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings.144
Justice Thomas wrote a very powerful dissent, which focused on the
language of the Bankruptcy Code.145 How far litigants and courts are
willing to stretch the holding, which barred discharge of a debt incurred
long before the debtor’s fraudulent conduct, will remain to be seen.
B. DISCHARGE UNDER 11 U.S.C. § 727: IN RE PACKER
Most individual debtors file a Chapter 7 petition with the primary in-
tent of obtaining a discharge. However, creditors sometimes seek to ex-
cept their debts from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523 or to block the
entire discharge under § 727. During the Survey period, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit handed down a brief but important case
showing that it is hard to block a discharge.146 Section 727 has many ele-
ments for creditors to meet.147
In In re Packer, the Fifth Circuit solidified its approach to denying dis-
charge under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) when it held that the party objecting to
the discharge failed to show the requisite fraudulent behavior that would
warrant such a denial.148 Plaintiff–Appellant Judgment Factors, L.L.C.
(Judgment Factors) filed an adversary proceeding to prevent the entry of
the Debtor’s Chapter 7 discharge pursuant to § 727(a)(2)(A) (improper
transfer); (a)(3) (failure to keep records); (a)(4)(A) (false oath); and
139. Id. at 1586.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1587.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1590.
145. See id. at 1590–91, 1594 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
146. See Judgment Factors, L.L.C. v. Packer (In re Packer), 816 F.3d 87, 89 (5th Cir.
2016) (per curiam).
147. See 11 U.S.C. § 727 (2012).
148. In re Packer, 816 F.3d at 89.
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(a)(5) (failure to explain loss of assets).149 The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for
the Eastern District of Texas granted the Debtor’s motion for summary
judgment, and the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas
affirmed.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit emphasized the requirement that “a ‘court
shall grant the debtor a discharge, unless’ the debtor engaged in specific
actions that are statutorily enumerated”—a proclamation that necessi-
tated a meticulous analysis of § 727(a) in light of the Debtor’s actions.150
Strictly interpreting the language in the various sections of § 727(a), and
taking into consideration well-established Fifth Circuit precedent, the
Fifth Circuit determined that the Debtor’s actions did not amount to the
fraudulent type of behavior that would merit a denial of discharge, as
none of the aforementioned provisions statutorily prohibited his ac-
tions.151 Because Judgment Factors was unable to prove each of the ele-
ments required for each of their claims under § 727(a), the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the trial court’s grant of the Debtor’s summary judgment.152
In re Packer highlights the expansiveness of broad Chapter 7 discharge
and how reluctant courts are to deny discharge under § 727(a). The Fifth
Circuit’s strict interpretation requires the party objecting to the discharge
to put forth evidence that falls specifically under one of the relevant pro-
visions of § 727(a), and simultaneously requires the debtor to have en-
gaged in specific and enumerated actions.
C. MORTGAGE PAYMENTS IN CHAPTER 13 BANKRUPTCY
PROCEEDINGS: IN RE KESSLER
Sometimes, debtors in Chapter 13 plans fall behind in their direct mort-
gage payments on their homes and yet remain current on their payments
to the Chapter 13 trustee under the plan. In a very important consumer
bankruptcy case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has now
held that such debtors have not completed their plan obligations and are
not entitled to a discharge at the end of the case.153
In In re Kessler, the Fifth Circuit held that post-petition payments
made directly to the Debtors’ mortgagor had to be paid before the Debt-
ors could receive discharge under the Debtors’ Chapter 13 plan.154 The
Chapter 13 plan provided for both direct post-petition payments on the
mortgage to the mortgagee and, importantly, payments to the trustee to
cure pre-petition mortgage arrears.155 “Despite their failure to make the
149. Id. at 90.
150. See id. at 91 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)).
151. See id. at 93–95. The Court also briefly touched on the alter ego and reverse veil
piercing theories proposed by Judgment Factors, but summarily dismissed them as claims
belonging to the estate, rather than to a creditor. See id. at 92.
152. Id. at 95.
153. Kessler v. Wilson (In re Kessler), 655 F. App’x 242, 244 (5th Cir. 2016) (per
curiam).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 243.
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[direct] post-petition mortgage payments, the [Debtors] moved for dis-
charge” in accordance with 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a), arguing that “[b]ecause
post-petition mortgage payments are . . . nondischargeable under
§ 1322(b)(5), . . . [their] direct payments [fell] outside of their plan and
[could not] be required for discharge under § 1328(a).”156
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit was left to decide whether “payments on
the post-petition mortgage debt were provided for ‘under the plan,’ and
thus [whether] nonpayment barred discharge.”157 Interpreting past prece-
dent, the Fifth Circuit affirmatively held that “post-petition payments of
§ 1322(b)(5) debts fall under the plan when pre-petition defaults are also
provided for in the plan.”158 Because the Debtors’ Chapter 13 plan pro-
vided for curing pre-petition mortgage arrears and for maintenance of
post-petition payments, the Debtors’ post-petition payments were pay-
ments “under the plan.”159 Given the § 1328(a) requirement that dis-
charge shall only be granted when all payments under the plan are paid,
the Fifth Circuit held that denial of discharge was appropriate.160
The facts of In re Kessler are not uncommon, as Chapter 13 debtors
often run into problems after the plan is confirmed. It is now clear that
direct payments made under a mortgage must also be paid, along with all
payments made to the Chapter 13 trustee pursuant to the plan, for a
debtor to receive a discharge at the end of the plan period.
D. SURRENDER UNDER A CHAPTER 13 “CURE-AND-MAINTAIN”
PLAN: IN RE DENNETT
Debtors who fail to pay their direct mortgage payments continue to
have limited options. In In re Dennett, a bankruptcy judge in the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas sua sponte ad-
dressed the ability of debtors to surrender their home and receive a dis-
charge notwithstanding their failure to make all direct mortgage
payments under their Chapter 13 plan.161
The case involved Chapter 13 debtors (the Debtors) who sought to
cure a default on a mortgage owed to Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (Na-
tionstar). The Debtors’ “cure-and-maintain” plan provided for the cure of
their prepetition mortgage arrears and ongoing direct mortgage payments
to Nationstar.162 The Debtors sought a discharge at the expiration of their
plan term, but had missed thirty-three of the required direct payments
156. Id. at 243–244; see 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(b)(5),1328(a) (2012).
157. In re Kessler, 655 F. App’x at 243.
158. Id. at 244 (citing Foster v. Heitkamp (In re Foster), 670 F.2d 478, 489, 493 (5th Cir.
1982).
159. Id. (citing In re Foster, 670 F.2d at 488–89).
160. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)). The Debtors also argued that the mortgagee
“waived its right to challenge discharge when it did not respond or object to [the] discharge
motion.” Id. This argument was rejected quickly; the Fifth Circuit said there is nothing in
the Bankruptcy Code or prior precedent that would require a trustee or creditor to “object
in order for a court to deny discharge.” Id. at 245 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1328).
161. In re Dennett, 548 B.R. 733, 734 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2016).
162. Id. at 735.
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under the plan.163 In order to make up for the missed payments, the
Debtors proposed to modify their plan and “surrender . . . their home in
full satisfaction of the claim held by Nationstar.”164
It is clear after In re Kessler that a debtor is unable to receive a dis-
charge if he fails to make all payments under his plan and that direct
payments under a “cure-and-maintain” plan are considered “payments
under the plan.”165 In In re Ramos, a recent opinion out of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas, surrender by way of
modification was not permitted to remedy a failure to make regular direct
mortgage payments under a “cure-and-maintain” plan.166 However, the
bankruptcy judge in the instant case disagreed with the rationale in In re
Ramos and chose not to categorically deny surrender as a means to cor-
rect a default under the plan.167
After reviewing various authorities on the subject, the bankruptcy
court concluded that surrender can be considered “payment” for pur-
poses of plan modifications under 11 U.S.C. § 1329(a).168 In this case, the
Debtors were not at the end of a five-year plan, the Debtors’ home was
worth more than the amount owed to Nationstar, and neither the Chap-
ter 13 trustee nor Nationstar objected to the modification.169 Thus, the
bankruptcy court held that the plan could be subject to modification.170
The issue of surrender near the end of a Chapter 13 plan is a hot one,
most likely waiting for guidance from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit.
VII. FEES
A. REDUCTION OF FEES REVIEWED UNDER 11 U.S.C. §§ 328(B)
AND 330(A): IN RE KING (KING I)
Ruling on proposed fees when creditors are unhappy is an unpleasant
job for a bankruptcy judge. Several cases during the Survey period point
out problem areas for bankruptcy practitioners.
In In re King (King I), the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of Texas reduced a law firm’s fee request by nearly two-thirds
after finding that the firm attempted to charge for services more appro-
priately requested by the trustee.171 The ruling sends a message to all
Chapter 7 trustees that diligence is required when reviewing the services
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. (citing In re Kessler, No. 09-60247-RLJ-13, 2015 WL 4726794, at *4 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. June 9, 2015), aff’d sub nom., Kessler v. Wilson (In re Kessler), 655 F. App’x 242
(5th Cir. 2016)).
166. Id. at 736 (citing In re Ramos, 540 B.R. 580, 584 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2015)).
167. Id. at 737.
168. Id. at 738.
169. Id. at 737.
170. Id. at 741–42.
171. In re King (King I), 546 B.R. 682, 685–86 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2016).
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their firms bill to the estate.172 The case arose when a law firm (the Firm)
filed its fee application for services related to its representation of a
Chapter 7 trustee (the Trustee) in the underlying bankruptcy case.173 The
Trustee was a named partner of the Firm.174 Shortly thereafter, the larg-
est unsecured creditor in the case, Western Surety Company (Western
Surety), filed an objection to the fee application.175 Western Surety ob-
jected because the requested fees were both “excessive” and for services
“that are part of the ordinary duties of a trustee.”176
The bankruptcy court analyzed the Firm’s fee application under 11
U.S.C. §§ 328(b) and 330(a). While “[t]he purpose of § 328(b) is to ensure
that the trustee’s firm is not compensated” for duties that the trustee is
required to fulfill under § 704(a), § 330(a) seeks “to ensure that the fees
awarded to the trustee’s firm are reasonable and only for services that
were actually and necessarily rendered.”177 Before conducting its
§ 328(b) analysis, the bankruptcy court set out perhaps a new standard
for determining whether a service performed by a law firm falls within
the statutory duties of a trustee. First, any services that do not require
legal assistance are “per se non-compensable.”178 Conversely, “any legal
services that require special expertise are per se compensable.”179 Finally,
the bankruptcy court accumulated a list of nine categories of services that
are “presumptively non-compensable,” such as reviewing and evaluating
claims, investigating estate property, and selling or disposing of assets.180
However, the bankruptcy court clarified that the presumption of non-
compensability can be overcome by demonstrating that the “services ren-
dered involved ‘unique difficulties’ beyond the trustee’s own ability to
handle [the] issues.”181
The bankruptcy court applied the § 328(b) analysis to the case at hand
by reviewing the time entries of three associates at the Firm. After re-
viewing the description of the services in the time entries, the bankruptcy
court concluded that the Firm sought compensation for both non-legal
services, which are per se non-compensable, and services that fall within
the “presumptively non-compensable” category.182 Moreover, the Firm
failed to meet its burden of establishing that the latter services involved
172. Id. at 685.
173. Id. at 685–86.
174. Id. at 686.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 692–93.
178. Id. at 699.
179. Id.
180. See id. at 699–700. The full list of any per se non-compensable non-legal services
includes: (1) “claim review and evaluation”; (2) “claim objection”; (3) “property demand”;
(4) “communication with creditors and other parties-in-interest”; (5) “investigation of es-
tate property”; (6) “selling or disposing of assets”; (7) “communication with and supervi-
sion of estate professionals”; (8) “review of the debtor’s records”; and (9) “review of
pleadings.” Id.
181. Id. at 700 (citing In re Kusler, 224 B.R. 180, 186 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1998)).
182. Id. at 701.
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“unique difficulties” that would require additional legal assistance.183 The
bankruptcy court ultimately “deduct[ed] the amount of $20,708.50 from
the . . . total requested fee amount of $123,282.25[, leaving] a balance of
$102,573.75.”184
Next, the bankruptcy court applied § 330(a) to the services that sur-
vived the § 328(b) analysis. Under § 330(a), a court may award “reasona-
ble compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by the trustee”
and “reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses.”185 The bankruptcy
court applied the “lodestar method,” an approach routinely used in the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to calculate reasonable attor-
neys’ fees.186 Under the lodestar method, courts calculate the “compensa-
ble hours billed” and the “reasonable hourly rate for the compensable
services,” and then multiply the figures to determine the amount of com-
pensable fees.187 In evaluating whether the hours billed by the Firm were
compensable, the bankruptcy court first analyzed whether the services
were either “reasonable or necessary” with regard to the case.188 At the
outset, the bankruptcy court disallowed 90.5 hours due to either vague or
lumped time entries.189 The bankruptcy court then analyzed whether the
remaining services were reasonable and necessary, ultimately disallowing
44.8 hours for failing to meet the standard.190 Finally, the bankruptcy
court disallowed 0.5 hours for excessive time.191 Thus, in the first step of
the lodestar method, the bankruptcy court deducted $52,047.00 from the
surviving $102,573.75, leaving a balance of $50,526.75 in compensable
hours billed.192
In the second step of the lodestar method, the bankruptcy court consid-
ered whether the Firm’s hourly rate was reasonable “by evaluating the
prevailing market rate.”193 The bankruptcy court concluded that the
Firm’s rates were reasonable based on comparable rates in the Houston
area.194 However, the bankruptcy court adjusted the requested fees
downward another $826.50 after concluding that assembling exhibit
booklets should be billed at a paralegal billing rate rather than an associ-
ate billing rate.195
Finally, the bankruptcy court considered whether the amount of fees
should be reduced based on the twelve factors articulated in Johnson v.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 709.
185. 11 U.S.C. § 330(a) (2012).
186. King I, 546 B.R. at 711.
187. Id. (citing In re Cahill, 428 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam)).
188. Id.
189. See id. at 712–20.
190. Id. at 720–27.
191. Id. at 726–27.
192. Id. at 727–28.
193. Id. at 728.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 729.
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Georgia Highway Express, Inc. or “other equitable factors.”196 Although
application of the Johnson factors did not result in an adjustment of the
fee, the bankruptcy court adjusted the fee downward another $7,559.50
based on three equitable factors: (1) “[t]he Trustee’s [f]ailure to
[p]roperly [s]upervise his own Firm”; (2) “[t]he Trustee’s
[m]isrepresentation in the Applications to Employ”; and (3) the Trustee’s
failure to “[o]btain [a]pproval of the $4,000.00 [s]ettlement that he
[e]ffectuated with the Debtor[.]”197 As a result, the bankruptcy court ulti-
mately approved fees in the amount of $42,140.75, representing an aggre-
gate reduction of $81,141.50 from the initially requested amount of
$123,282.25.198
The bankruptcy court concluded by stating that in all cases in which a
Chapter 7 trustee hires her own law firm to represent her, fee applica-
tions proposed by the firm will require a hearing, even if the applications
are unopposed.199 At these hearings, testimony by the trustee regarding
the “unique difficulties” requiring the law firm’s engagement will be
mandatory, and the U.S. Trustee will be required to attend.200 The bank-
ruptcy court cautioned that § 327(a)—the Bankruptcy Code provision
that allows a trustee to retain his own firm for representation—does not
operate as a “license for the trustee and his firm to milk the estate for all
it is worth.”201
By any measure, a reduction of a requested fee by two-thirds is sub-
stantial. However, King I lays out clear guidelines, at least to trustees in
the Southern District who hire their own firms, to avoid charging extra
for duties that are more properly expected of the trustee than counsel.
B. MAY I HAVE ANOTHER?: IN RE KING (KING II)
Part two of a court’s ruling can sometimes be even harder than the
first. Seven months after the first memorandum opinion (the First Opin-
ion) was issued in King I, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of Texas in Houston ruled regarding the fee application submit-
ted by the Chapter 7 trustee (the Trustee).202 The Trustee had hired his
own law firm (the Firm) to represent him in his capacity as trustee.203 The
First Opinion found that “the Trustee had violated his fiduciary duty to
the estate ‘by allowing his firm to seek illegitimate fees from the es-
tate.’”204 In a footnote in the First Opinion, the bankruptcy court ex-
pressed concern over “the Trustee’s failure to properly monitor the Law
196. Id. at 711, 729–34 (citing Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 718
(5th Cir. 1974), abrogated on other grounds by Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989)).
197. See id. at 730–34.
198. Id. at 736.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 737.
201. Id.
202. In re King (King II), 559 B.R. 158, 159 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2016).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 159 (quoting King I, 546 B.R. at 685).
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Firm’s billing” and notified the Trustee that it “would hold a hearing on
his eventual application [for] statutory trustee fee[s]” due to this lack of
oversight.205
Although the Trustee’s application requested compensation for
$28,461.93—the maximum amount available under 11 U.S.C. § 326(a)—
the bankruptcy court ultimately awarded only $5,692.39.206 Rehashing
some of the problems discussed in the First Opinion, the bankruptcy
court first determined that awarding the maximum amount available
under § 326(a) would be inequitable and disproportionate due to “nu-
merous glaring problems” with the Trustee’s administration of the
case.207 First, the Trustee breached his fiduciary duty to creditors “by al-
lowing his Firm to seek illegitimate fees from the estate[,]” which was the
subject of the First Opinion.208 Furthermore, “the Trustee violated Rule
9019 by unilaterally settling a portion of his objection to the Debtor’s
exemptions,” thus robbing the estate’s creditors of the opportunity to ob-
ject to the settlement.209 The bankruptcy court also found that the Trus-
tee made two misrepresentations to the court upon seeking approval to
retain the Firm: that claims would be reviewed and assessed without the
incurrence of legal fees and that he would ensure that hiring the Firm
would be in the best interest of the estate.210 Finally, the Trustee violated
Rule 2016(a) by failing to submit documentation describing the services
rendered or the time expended rendering such services, despite the
Rule’s requirement that a “detailed statement” of such matters be
provided.211
Next, the bankruptcy court considered three of the factors listed in
§ 330(a)(3) to reach its conclusion that a “substantial reduction” of the
fee was warranted.212 The first two factors required the court to consider
“the time spent by the Trustee providing services related to the adminis-
tration of the estate” and “the effective hourly rate for these services
given the [requested] fee of $28,461.93.”213 After reviewing the time en-
tries, the bankruptcy court found that the Trustee spent approximately 8.5
hours working on the case, which resulted in an effective hourly rate of
$3,011.85.214 Given that this rate was “more than double the highest paid
hourly rate for an attorney . . . in Houston[,]” the bankruptcy court deter-
mined that the “application of [the first two] factors . . . justifie[d] a sub-
stantial reduction in the amount of the fee requested by the Trustee.”215
The third factor required the bankruptcy court to consider “the Trustee’s
205. Id. (citing King I, 546 B.R. at 689 n.3).
206. Id.
207. Id. at 168.
208. Id. at 165 (citing King I, 546 B.R. at 685).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 165–66.
211. Id. at 166–67 (citing FED. R. BANKR. P. 2016(a)).
212. Id. at 169, 171.
213. Id. at 169.
214. Id. at 170.
215. Id. at 170–71.
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board-certification, skill, and experience in the bankruptcy field.”216 Be-
cause of the Trustee’s substantial experience in bankruptcy law and board
certification in business bankruptcy law, the bankruptcy court determined
that the Trustee’s poor performance in the administration of the case jus-
tified further reduction of the fee.217
Finally, the bankruptcy court adopted the “grading” approach used by
the court in In re Phillips218 to determine a “reasonable” fee pursuant to
§ 326(a).219 Taking all of the Trustee’s conduct into consideration, the
bankruptcy court concluded that his efforts were “below ‘merely good or
average’ for a trustee of his caliber and his experience,” and ultimately
lowered the requested fee from $28,461.93 to $5,692.39.220 The opinion
ended on a stern note:
The message should now be clear: This Court will not automatically
award any Chapter 7 trustee the maximum amount allowed by
§ 326(a), and this is so even if no objections to the fee application are
lodged. If the Court, after reviewing a trustee’s fee application,
chooses not to approve the fee request in chambers, but rather sets a
hearing, then the trustee must earn his fee the old fashioned way:
Prove it.221
The Trustee’s fees in this case were cut nearly eighty percent. In a case
where the court finds a breach of fiduciary duty and misrepresentation, it
is hard to fault the judge for expressing concerns. That said, it is unclear
whether other bankruptcy judges in Texas or the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit will adopt this grading approach. The authors in-
cluded the King cases in this Survey as a word of warning to trustees and
their counsel.
C. VIOLATION OF DUTIES: IN RE CHAPTER 13 PLAN ADMINISTRATION
IN THE BROWNSVILLE, CORPUS CHRISTI
& MCALLEN DIVISIONS
Trustees and bankruptcy judges hold two different roles in the bank-
ruptcy process, so when a bankruptcy court publicly admonishes a trustee
and the court itself, lawyers should pay very close attention. In In re
Chapter 13 Plan Administration in the Brownsville, Corpus Christi &
McAllen Divisions, the chief bankruptcy judge for the U.S. Bankruptcy
Court for the Southern District of Texas issued an opinion taking the lo-
cal Chapter 13 trustee (the Trustee) to task, while explicitly rebuking the
former practices of the court.222
216. Id. at 169.
217. Id. at 171.
218. 392 B.R. 378, 391–92 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2008).
219. King II, 559 B.R. at 172.
220. Id. at 173–74 (“Just like children in school who are lazy, cheat, rely on others to do
their work, and are caught in the act, the Trustee here deserves a ‘D’ . . . .”).
221. Id. at 176.
222. In re Chapter 13 Plan Admin. in the Brownsville, Corpus Christi & McAllen Divs.,
No. 15-701, 2016 WL 2772099, at *6 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. May 6, 2016).
2017] Bankruptcy 59
Here, the Trustee and a former bankruptcy judge for the division had
been administering Chapter 13 plans in a manner that was inconsistent
with the Uniform Plan and Motion for Valuation of Collateral (Uniform
Plan) implemented by the Southern District of Texas.223 Specifically, the
Trustee was conducting Chapter 13 cases where mortgage payments had
increased in disparate ways to other locations throughout the District and
the Division, under the direction of the former judge.224 Although the
Trustee denied that she had been conducting Chapter 13 cases incor-
rectly, and the retired bankruptcy judge provided a written affidavit sup-
porting the Trustee, the bankruptcy court was not convinced.225
First, the chief judge expressly voiced his concerns involving the previ-
ous actions of the bankruptcy court. Addressing the conduct of a bank-
ruptcy judge, the chief judge stated that “[t]he most fundamental tenet of
[the Code of Conduct] is the responsibility that judges have to follow the
law,” and “[l]ocal rules have the force of law so long as they do not con-
flict with a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, Congress or the Consti-
tution.”226 Therefore, the chief judge found that the bankruptcy court’s
previous refusal to follow the Uniform Plan was tantamount to not fol-
lowing the law, which in turn severely undermines confidence in the judi-
cial system and the rule of law.227
Next, the chief judge took aim at the UST and his failure to adequately
monitor Chapter 13 plans in this instance.228 He emphasized that the
UST has the duty to supervise standing Chapter 13 trustees and take ap-
propriate action when necessary.229
Lastly, the chief judge admonished the Trustee and her administration
of cases. Beginning with the role of the Trustee in the Chapter 13 process,
the chief judge noted, “as a fiduciary and an officer of the Court, a Chap-
ter 13 trustee has the duties of candor, care, loyalty, and impartiality.”230
The chief judge found that all three parties had violated their various
duties.231 The Trustee and the UST were given the opportunity by the
bankruptcy court to craft a remedy for debtors affected by the Trustee’s
actions but failed to produce a suitable option.232 Thus, the chief judge
crafted his own remedies for debtors who had overpaid or underpaid,
including the availability of potential liability for the Trustee.233 Further-
more, the chief judge ordered a direct review of the Trustee’s practices
223. Id. at *1–2.
224. Id.
225. Id. at *1–2, *6.






231. Id. at *6.
232. Id.
233. Id.
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and competencies by the UST.234
Finally, the chief judge ended his ruling with a heartfelt apology on
behalf of the bankruptcy court. The force of his remarks may only be felt
by reading the statement in full. He closed:
All citizens deserve equal treatment under the law regardless of race,
creed, gender or geographic location. The bankruptcy process in the
Southern District of Texas has failed Chapter 13 debtors in the
Brownsville, Corpus Christi and McAllen divisions. On behalf of the
Bankruptcy Court, the undersigned offers its sincere apology to
those debtors and their families that did not receive the justice they
deserve. The Court hopes that practitioners in these divisions will
share this Order with their clients and convey just how hard it is for
the undersigned to publicly recognize the failure of a system that he
took an oath to protect. There will be no more secret rules, unspoken
practices or disparate treatment of citizens in different divisions. We
are one Bankruptcy Court with a single set of written rules. All citi-
zens within the Southern District of Texas will be treated equally and
with respect.235
By any measure, this case is ugly for all concerned, and whether the
possible imposition of personal liability on the Chapter 13 trustee will
withstand a challenge of immunity is up in the air. However, this case
serves as a stark reminder of the duties of all officers of the court.
VIII. INVOLUNTARY CASES: IN RE BATES
Successful involuntary bankruptcy petitions are difficult because 11
U.S.C. § 303 has stiff requirements as to the number of petitioners, the
amount of their claims, the validity of the petitioners’ debts, and the re-
quirement that the potential debtor be generally not paying its debts.236
A recent case during the Survey period, In re Bates, provides an excellent
analysis of the “generally not paying” requirement of 11 U.S.C
§ 303(h)(1).237
In In re Bates, an involuntary petition was filed against an individual
(the Putative Debtor), who objected to the filing.238 In considering
whether an order for relief could be entered against the Putative Debtor,
the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Texas examined 11
U.S.C. § 303(h)(1), which states:
(h) . . . the court shall order relief against the debtor in an involun-
tary case under the chapter under which the petition was filed, only
if—(1) the debtor is generally not paying such debtor’s debts as such
debts become due unless such debts are the subject of a bona fide
dispute as to liability or amount . . . .239
234. Id. at *7.
235. Id.
236. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(b), (h) (2012).
237. In re Bates, 545 B.R. 183, 186 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2016).
238. Id. at 185.
239. 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(1); In re Bates, 545 B.R. at 186.
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The bankruptcy court applied the four-factor “generally not paying”
test from the In re Norris case to determine that the Putative Debtor was
“generally not paying” his debts as they became due.240 The In re Norris
test includes the following factors: (1) “[t]he number of unpaid claims not
subject to a bona fide dispute”; (2) “[t]he amount of such claims”; (3)
“[t]he materiality of the non-payments”; and (4) “[t]he [Putative
Debtor’s] overall conduct in his financial affairs.”241 The bankruptcy
court found that the “Putative Debtor was generally paying on thirteen [ ]
debts as they became due and was not paying five [ ] creditors whose
debts were currently due” that amounted to a substantial percentage of
the Putative Debtor’s liability.242
In applying the first prong, the bankruptcy court found that “ a final
judgment that has not been stayed is not subject to a bona fide dis-
pute”243 and that small recurring monthly payments to creditors could
not be considered when applying the “generally not paying” test.244 “The
Bankruptcy Code does not define the term ‘bona fide dispute,’” but the
objective standard adopted by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit prevents a petitioning creditor from using involuntary bankruptcy
if the debtor has a “basis for either a factual or a legal dispute as to the
validity of the debt.”245
After an examination of the second prong of the “generally not pay-
ing” test, the bankruptcy court found that, as of the petition date, the
Putative Debtor was not paying on debts amounting to over $130,000 and
was paying on debts in an amount just over $18,000.246
In applying the last two prongs of the test, the bankruptcy court further
found that the Putative Debtor was only paying the debts he wanted to
pay, instead of paying all debts equally, and that the Putative Debtor en-
gaged in financial misconduct.247 Thus, after considering all four factors
of the “generally not paying” test, the bankruptcy court concluded that
the Putative Debtor was generally not paying his debts as such debts be-
come due pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(1), and an order for relief was
entered accordingly.248
240. In re Bates, 545 B.R. at 186 (citing In re Norris, 183 B.R. 437, 455–57 (Bankr. W.D.
La. 1995)). The In re Norris test was adopted by a bankruptcy court in the Northern Dis-
trict of Texas in the In re Moss case. Id. (citing In re Moss, 249 B.R. 411, 422 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 2000)).
241. Id. at 187–92.
242. Id. at 189–90.
243. Id. at 187 (citing Norris v. Johnson (In re Norris), No. 96-30146, 1997 WL 256808,
at *5 (5th Cir. Apr. 11, 1997) (per curiam)).
244. Id. at 188 (citing In re Smith, 415 B.R. 222, 232 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2009)).
245. Id. at 187 (citing Subway Equip. Leasing Corp. v. Sims (In re Sims), 994 F.2d 210,
221 (5th Cir. 1993)).
246. Id. at 189–90.
247. Id. at 192.
248. Id. at 193. When determining that an order or relief should be entered, a court
must also find that the petitioning creditors have not acted in bad faith. The court in this
case made such a finding. Id. at 192–93.
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In re Bates provides good guidance to lawyers contemplating the filing
of an involuntary bankruptcy petition.
IX. 11 U.S.C. § 522
A. 11 U.S.C. § 522(Q): IN RE WYLY
In 2005, Congress enacted limitations to the previously unlimited
homestead exemption provisions of certain states, including Texas.249
These limits occur upon certain pre-petition actions of a debtor. There
are not many Texas cases applying the limits; however, in this Survey pe-
riod, the following case was a doozy.
Although bankruptcy law requires a balancing of federal and state law,
it is important to remember that at the end of the day the Code wins. In
the case of In re Wyly,250 debtor Sam Wyly was reminded of that when he
argued that his unlimited homestead exemption provided by Texas law
was not subject to the Code’s cap in 11 U.S.C. § 522(q) for the violation
of federal securities laws. While the case featured other issues, § 522 of
the Code will be the focus here.
Following entry of a judgment against Wyly for securities fraud in the
amount of $123 million, Wyly filed for Chapter 11 protection in the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas.251 In his schedules,
Wyly elected Texas exemptions that provided him with an unlimited
homestead exemption for his house, valued at approximately $12.1 mil-
lion.252 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) moved for sum-
mary judgment, arguing that 11 U.S.C. § 522(q)(1) capped Wyly’s
homestead exemption at $155,675, and Wyly made a cross motion for
summary judgment, arguing that the provision was not applicable due to
the nature of the case.253
First, the bankruptcy court found that the uncontroverted evidence at
trial established that the property at issue qualified as Wyly’s home-
stead.254 It then recognized that, unquestionably, “a debtor’s unlimited
Texas homestead exemption may be limited in bankruptcy by the applica-
tion of 11 U.S.C. § 522(q).”255 The bankruptcy court next turned to
249. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(q) (2012).
250. See 553 B.R. 318, 323–24, 331 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2016).
251. Id. at 323.
252. Id. at 323–24.
253. Id. at 320, 334. 11 U.S.C. § 522(q) provides in relevant part:
(q)(1) As a result of electing . . . to exempt property under State or local law,
a debtor may not exempt any amount of an interest in [homestead property]
. . . which exceeds in the aggregate $160,375 if . . . (B) the debtor owes a debt
arising from—(i) any violation of the Federal securities laws (as defined in
section 3(a)(47) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934), any State securities
laws, or any regulation or order issued under Federal securities laws or State
securities laws . . . .
(2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to the extent the amount of an interest in
[the homestead] property . . . is reasonably necessary for the support of the
debtor and any dependent of the debtor.
254. In re Wyly, 553 B.R. at 331.
255. Id.
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whether the judgment against Wyly qualified as a “debt arising from a
violation of Federal securities laws.”256 In finding that it did so qualify,
the bankruptcy court examined the definitions of “debt” and “claim”
under the Bankruptcy Code.257
In its determination, the bankruptcy court held that the judgment fell
under the definition of “debt” for purposes of § 522(q), even though it
was up for appeal.258 It further noted that Wyly had merely appealed the
damages calculation from the lower court, choosing not to appeal the
finding that he had committed fraud.259 Thus, the bankruptcy court rea-
soned that even if the amount Wyly was required to disgorge was reduced
to a single dollar, it would be enough to trigger the application of
§ 522(q)(1).260 Furthermore, the bankruptcy court held that because the
SEC agreed not to sell the homestead or to remove Wyly from the home-
stead until the conclusion of the appeals process, capping Wyly’s home-
stead exemption did not prejudice him.261
Simply put, the bankruptcy court found that the plain meaning of
§ 522(q)(1) meant what it said, despite unknown outcomes in the appel-
late process.262 Thus, the savings clause in § 522(q)(2), the application of
which was to be argued at a later date, was left as Wyly’s only chance to
save a greater amount of the equity in his homestead.263
B. 11 U.S.C. § 522(O) AND § 522(P): IN RE COLLIAU
The 2005 amendments did not just add a cap to homestead exemptions
for debtors who had engaged in securities fraud; Congress also imposed
limits upon general state law homestead exemptions in 11 U.S.C. § 522,
subsections (o) and (p).264 Under § 522(o), the exemption may be limited
by a debtor’s fraudulent pre-petition payments towards his homestead.265
Under § 522(p), a recently acquired homestead may be subject to a dollar
cap.266 During the Survey period, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
Western District of Texas issued an order that addresses both of these
sections.267
In re Colliau focused on the interaction between § 522, subsections (o)
and (p), and whether these two subsections should be read “in conjunc-
tion or independently[,]” as well as on the snapshot rule and its applica-
tion with respect to waiting for appreciation of property.268 The case




260. Id. at 333.
261. Id.
262. See id.
263. See id. at 335.
264. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(o), (p).
265. See id. § 522(o).
266. See id. § 522(p).
267. In re Colliau, 552 B.R. 158, 161 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2016).
268. Id. at 159, 161.
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involved homestead property that was purchased within 1,215 days of
bankruptcy and therefore subject to the § 522(p) cap of $311,350.269
In an oral ruling, the bankruptcy court employed § 522(o) and § 522(p)
in conjunction to reduce the exemption cap in § 522(p).270 The bank-
ruptcy court found, under § 522(o), that improvements in the amount of
$11,156 “on the eve of bankruptcy” must be deducted from the Debtors’
interest in the homestead because they were made “with the intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.”271 Thus, the bankruptcy court de-
ducted the cost of the improvements from the $311,350272 cap in § 522(p),
reducing the cap to $300,000.273 The bankruptcy court further found that
$16,000 was required for maintenance of the home and deducted that
amount from the Debtors’ $316,000 equity interest in the home, leaving
their total interest in the homestead at $300,000.274 The bankruptcy court
concluded that the Debtors’ interest did not exceed the reduced § 522(p)
cap.275
A creditor of the Debtors and the Chapter 7 Trustee objected, arguing
that § 522(p) and § 522(o) should be read independently and that the cost
of the improvements should be deducted from the equity the Debtors
owned in the property.276 After a second review of the case, the bank-
ruptcy court agreed and amended its ruling.277
The bankruptcy court noted that leaving the estate without an interest
in the property or the amount of the improvements, even though the im-
provements fell under § 522(o), was contrary to the policy and intent of
§ 522(o) and § 522(p).278 The bankruptcy court reviewed the meaning of
“interest” in § 522(o) and determined that the Debtors’ interest in the
property was essentially the amount of equity in the property.279 Thus,
the bankruptcy court reduced the Debtors’ equity in the property, instead
269. Id. at 159–60. 11 U.S.C. § 522(p)(1) states:
[A]s a result of electing . . . to exempt property under State or local law, a
debtor may not exempt any amount of interest that was acquired by the
debtor during the 1215-day period preceding the date of the filing of the
petition that exceeds in the aggregate $160,375 in value in . . . (D) real or
personal property that the debtor or dependent of the debtor claims as a
homestead.
270. In re Colliau, 552 B.R. at 160–61.
271. Id. at 160; see also 11 U.S.C. § 522(o). Section 522(o) provides in part:
[T]he value of an interest in . . . real or personal property that the debtor . . .
claims as a homestead[ ] shall be reduced to the extent that such value is
attributable to any portion of any property that the debtor disposed of in the
10-year period ending on the date of the filing of the petition with the intent
to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor and that the debtor could not exempt
. . . .
272. Since this case involved two joint debtors, the value listed in § 522(p)(1) is
doubled. In re Colliau, 552 B.R. at 161 n.7.




277. Id. at 160–61.
278. Id. at 161.
279. Id. (citing In re Presto, 376 B.R. 554, 600 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2007)).
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of the § 522(p) cap, by the amount of the improvements, without consid-
ering the costs of maintaining the estate.280
Relying on In re Cipolla281 to determine that § 105(a) gave it general
authority to impose an equitable lien, the bankruptcy court then allowed
the estate to realize the amount of the improvements, plus any additional
equity above the § 522(p) cap, by placing such a lien on the house.282
Without addressing the Texas proceeds rule, the bankruptcy court gave
the Debtors ninety days to satisfy the lien and avoid a forced sale.283
The Chapter 7 Trustee argued that the estate should be able to realize
any value of the homestead above the § 522(p) cap, if and when the home
appreciated above the cap amount.284 The bankruptcy court disagreed,
explaining that the snapshot rule, which directs that the exemption status
of an asset is fixed as of the petition date, precludes such a holding.285
The bankruptcy court distinguished the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in
Schwab v. Reilly, finding that since the homestead was valued below the
§ 522(p) cap on the petition date, the bankruptcy estate had no interest in
the homestead property, even if the value of the property later appreci-
ated.286 Therefore, the homestead property was exempt and thus re-
moved from the estate, and if the property later appreciated above the
cap, the benefit would go to the Debtors rather than the bankruptcy
estate.287
This is a good case to read to understand § 522(o) and § 522(p), and
how they may interact. In re Colliau also contributes to the governing
case law regarding Texas homesteads in Chapter 7 cases. To the authors,
some cases appear to be contrary to most practitioners’ early understand-
ing of the laws. In re Colliau appears to be correct and helps clear some
of the fog.
X. RECLASSIFICATION OF A DEFICIENCY CLAIM:
IN RE RODGERS
In In re Rodgers, a former Texas attorney, now serving as a judge for
the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Alabama,
weighed in on whether surrender can result in reclassification of a defi-
ciency claim.288 The bankruptcy court held that a Chapter 13 debtor can
280. Id.
281. In In re Cipolla, Judge Gargotta used § 105(a) to grant an equitable lien to the
estate to secure the interest in the property and allow the trustee to sell for failure to
compensate the estate within six months. Id. at 162 (citing In re Cipolla, No. 09-11199, ECF




284. Id. at 163.
285. Id. at 163, 164 (citing Brown v. Sommer (In re Brown), 807 F.3d 701, 708–10 (5th
Cir. 2015)).
286. Id. at 163–64 (citing Schwab v. Reilly, 560 U.S. 770, 775–76, 782 (2010)).
287. Id. at 164.
288. In re Rodgers, No. 14-83452-CRJ-13, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 3880, at *1–2 (Bankr.
N.D. Ala. Nov. 2, 2016).
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“surrender collateral and . . . reclassify [any] remaining deficiency as an
unsecured claim” provided the modification is proposed in good faith and
meets the requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 1329.289 When the Debtors’ Chap-
ter 13 plan (the Plan) was confirmed, both Debtors were employed.290
Following confirmation of the Plan, one of the Debtors lost her job, re-
sulting in an inability of the Debtors’ to meet the payment requirements
of the Plan.291 The Debtors then filed a Motion to Modify, seeking to
surrender their vehicle in order to reduce their Plan payments and reclas-
sify the deficiency balance as unsecured.292
In reaching a decision, the bankruptcy court recognized that there is a
circuit split regarding whether a Chapter 13 debtor may be permitted to
surrender collateral post-confirmation and have the deficiency treated as
an unsecured claim.293 The bankruptcy court rejected the minority view
adopted by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Chrysler
Financial Corporation v. Nolan because, in holding that a “post-confirma-
tion surrender and reclassification is per se impermissible,” the Sixth Cir-
cuit “has read several artificial restrictions into § 1329 that are not
grounded in the plain text of the statute.”294 Rather, the bankruptcy court
opted for a broad interpretation of § 1329 that takes “Congress’s intent
. . . to facilitate successful completion of chapter 13 plans” into ac-
count.295 The bankruptcy court based this decision on two recent holdings
from other bankruptcy courts: In re Scarver from the U.S. Bankruptcy
Court for the Middle District of Alabama and In re Anderson from the
U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Mississippi.296
The bankruptcy court ultimately adopted the reasoning of In re
Scarver.297 In that case, the debtor’s Plan included a $4,900 secured auto
loan.298 Shortly after confirmation, the vehicle was totaled in an accident
and the debtor’s insurance company paid only $2,802, leaving a balance
of $2,098.299 The In re Scarver court determined that a post-confirmation
plan modification resulting in the surrender of collateral and the remain-
ing deficiency balance being treated as an unsecured claim is permissible,
provided the modification meets the requirements of § 1329 and is made
in good faith.300 Courts have traditionally considered five non-exclusive
289. Id. at *4 (citing In re Scarver, 555 B.R. 822 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2016)).
290. Id. at *5–6.
291. Id. at *7.
292. Id. at *8.
293. Id. at *10 (citing In re Scarver, 555 B.R. at 828).
294. Id. at *10, *12 (first citing Chrysler Fin. Corp. v. Nolan (In re Nolan), 232 F.3d 528,
535 (6th Cir. 2000); and then citing In re Scarver, 555 B.R. at 834).
295. Id. at *15–16 (quoting In re Anderson, 545 B.R. 174, 181 (Bankr. N.D. Miss.
2015)).
296. See id. at *14–15; see also In re Scarver, 555 B.R. at 833; In re Anderson, 545 B.R.
at 181.
297. In re Rodgers, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 3880, at *4, *16.
298. Id. at *14 (citing In re Scarver, 555 B.R. at 825).
299. Id.
300. Id. at *13.
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factors to determine good faith when a debtor seeks to surrender a
vehicle:
(1) the extent of any post-confirmation depreciation in the collateral
securing the affected creditor’s claim, and whether the depreciation
is the fault of the debtor;
(2) whether the debtor failed to maintain insurance as required by a
loan agreement or an adequate protection order;
(3) the proposed treatment of the creditor’s deficiency claim (if any
such claim exists);
(4) whether the debtor is current on plan payments; and
(5) the length of time between plan confirmation and the filing of
the proposed modification.301
The In re Scarver court found that the necessary good faith require-
ment was satisfied because there was no evidence that the decline in the
vehicle’s value was due to any fault of the debtor.302 As stated above, the
bankruptcy court in In re Rodgers adopted the In re Scarver court’s rea-
soning, holding that surrender and reclassification of a deficiency claim
may be allowed where the court finds good faith.303
In re Rodgers is a good case to keep in mind when calamity strikes after
plan confirmation. Options remain available for the good faith debtor.
XI. CONCLUSION
Although the U.S. Supreme Court was rather quiet on bankruptcy dur-
ing the Survey period, it did hand down one very significant decision that
may have great effect in the dischargeability realm.304 The Supreme
Court also set up two important cases, one in the consumer area305 and
the other a business case that may go well beyond Chapter 11,306 for cov-
erage next year. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit continues
to resolve differences in the bankruptcy courts in the circuit. Moreover,
the bankruptcy courts have tackled tough issues that have a real impact,
particularly in the consumer bankruptcy area. Overall, 2016 provided a
fulsome Survey period for the courts.
301. Id. at *13–14 (quoting In re Scarver, 555 B.R. at 838).
302. Id. at *14.
303. Id. at *4, *16.
304. See supra Part VI, Section A.
305. Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 137 S. Ct. 326 (2016) (mem.). As this case is
really more of a consumer law case than a bankruptcy case, the authors did not include it in
this Survey. Depending on the scope of the ruling, the authors reserve the right to include
it next time. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit’s judgment outside of
this Survey period in Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 137 S. Ct. 1407 (2017)).
306. See supra Part II, Section A and text accompanying note 26; see also Czyzewski v.
Jevic Holding Corp. 137 S. Ct. 973 (2017).
